Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and the Finnish Depression in the Beginning of the 1990s by Shen, Jian-Guang
Helsingin yliopisto - Helsingfors universitet - University of Helsinki ID 2000-462
Tiedekunta-Fakultet-Faculty
Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta
Laitos-Institution-Department
Department of Economics
Tekijä-Författare-Author
Shen, Jian-Guang
Työn nimi-Arbetets titel-Title
Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and the Finnish Depression in the Beginning of the 1990s
Oppiaine-Läroämne-Subject
Economics
Työn laji-Arbetets art-Level
Licentiate thesis
Aika-Datum-Month and year
1999-03-04
Sivumäärä-Sidantal-Number of pages
94 s.
Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
The world economy has witnessed increasingly frequent currency crises in recent years. The Finnish currency crisis and the resultant depression
provide a very valuable case study for understanding the reasons for a currency crisis, the monetary policy options and agent behavior before and
during the crisis. The central bank's monetary policy has an important role to play before and in the midst of a currency crisis. This paper
develops a theoretical model to analyze monetary policy and currency crisis. The switch of an exchange rate regime is considered as the result of
an optimizing decision by the policymaker. The emphasis is on the optimal decision-making of the central bank and its impact on economic
activity. A banking sector is modeled so that interest rates can be determined endogenously. The optimal behavior of the consumer and firm are
also taken account of. Here the interaction between the bank and the firm is set in a Stackelberg game framework. The bank is the Stackelberg
leader, which sets a lending rate first. Then the firm reacts with a desirable level of bank loan. The central bank's optimal decision on the
exchange rate is based on the interaction of all other agents. The central bank faces conflicting interests in deciding the exchange rate, which will
have different impacts on the open and closed sectors of the economy. Under a fixed exchange rate system, the dynamic-inconsistency problems
the central bank faces result in multiple solutions. The model shows that two equilibria could exist. The first one features no deviation of the
private sector's expectations from the fixed exchange rate system. Then it is always in the central bank's interest to maintain the fixed exchange
rate. There will be no speculative attack, and the fixed exchange rate system can be sustained. The second one features a currency crisis as the
change in expectations validates a change in economic fundamentals, which makes the change in the exchange rate ideal given the central bank's
policy preferences. Thus the currency crisis is really self-fulfilling.
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